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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ED CASSITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. J. CASTAGNO, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict with the 
case having been submitted to the jury on special interroga-
tories. The Complaint was filed by appellant, to which the 
respondent filed his counterclaims, with appellant thereafter 
filing cross-claims to respondent's counterclaims. The parties 
own intermingled and adjacent range and ranch lands in 
Tooele County, Utah, and the action and counter actions have 
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been mainly to restrain each from making any use of the lands 
of the other and, incidentally, to secure damages growing out 
of past use of each other's lands and for small amounts allegedly 
due as the result of minor relationships relating to past use 
and improvement of the lands involved. 
Money damages were found by the verdict and provided 
in the judgment for each party against the other in exactly the 
same amount. 
The interrogatories propounded to the jury and their 
answers thereto constituting the verdict are as follows: 
"We the Jury in the above entitled case find the answers 
to the following interrogatories as follows: 
1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant trespassed upon the lands of the plaintiff during 
the period between May 31, 1952, and May 31, 1955 ? (Answer 
yes or no.) Answer Yes. 
2. If your answer to the question One above is "yes," 
what damages, if any, do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence the plaintiff has suffered by reason of such trespass 
or trespasses? Amount $250.00. 
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff trespassed upon the lands of the defendant during 
the period between November 15, 1952 and November 15, 
1955? (Answer yes or no.) Answer Yes. 
4. If your answer to Three above is "yes," what damages, 
if any, do you find by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
defendant has suffered by reason of such trespass or trespasses? 
Amount $250.00. 
4 
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5. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant and the plaintiff entered into a contract dealing 
with the grazing of defendant's lands by the plaintiff on Stans-
bury Island? (Answer yes or no.) Answer No. 
6. If your answer to No. 5 above, is yes, what amount, 
if any, do you find the plaintiff owes the defendant? Amount 
None. 
7. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the defendant and the plaintiff entered into a contract dealing 
furnishing wire to build a fence? (Answer yes or no.) Answer 
No. 
8. If your answer to No. 7 above was yes, what amount, 
if any, do you find the plaintiff owes the defendant? Answer 
None. 
9. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership and possession 
drove or trailed their cattle across the defendant's lands in 
going to and from Stansbury Island? Answer yes or no.) 
Answer Yes. 
10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer the following 
questions: 
a. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff and his predeces-
sor in ownership and possession regularly use the defendant's 
land for that purpose for 20 consecutive years? (Answer yes 
or no.) Answer Yes. 
b. Did the trail, if any, follow the same general course 
and direction during the 20 year period referred to in the next 
preceding question ? Answer Yes. 
5 
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11, Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used the lands 
of the defendant in Section 9 and 22, Township 2 South, 
Range 5 West, and the water holes, if any, upon said lands to 
water his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior to 
May 31, 1955? Answer Yes. 
a. If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer the following 
question: 
For how many consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955, 
has the plaintiff and his predecessors in ownership used said 
lands and water holes? Answer 50 years. 
Dated this 17th day of January, 1957. 
/ s / Ross Gown." 
In addition to the above findings of the Jury the Court 
made findings of fact independent thereof. From its judgment 
determining that appellant owns no rights to the use of water 
located upon respondent's lands; from its further determination 
that appellant has acquired no right to trail across or otherwise 
use respondent's lands, and from the judgment determining 
the ownership and use of the lands involved the appellant 
brings this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cassity, the plaintiff and appellant, is a cattleman operat-
ing several hundred head of cattle upon the lands which were 
formerly used in this identical cattle operation by his father-
in-law, John Castagno, (R 116) deceased. (R 5, 8, 131, 225, 
169,301, 117). 
6 
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Castagno, the defendant and respondent herein, is the 
oldest son (R 115) of the said John Castagno, and the parties 
herein are brothers-in-law (R 5), Cassity having married the 
daughter of the deceased, John Castagno (R 142). 
After the death of his father, the defendant herein ac-
quired ownership and leasehold control of said lands which 
are so intermingled with the lands his brother-in-law, Cassity, 
had acquired from the estate of his father that a use is made 
of these lands and the waters located upon them by the Cassity 
Cattle (R 117, 118, 119, 120, 170, 193-4, 70, 71). 
The case involves range lands and the waters located 
upon those lands and the rights as between the parties to use 
those properties (pleadings; verdict). As to a part of these 
properties the holdings of the parties are so intermingled 
that it is not possible for either to use his own property without 
using that of the other (Ex. I, R 169, 193-4, 198, 285, 163-5, 
167). And it is not possible for Cassity to get back and forth 
between the winter range and the summer range areas without 
trailing his cattle across a part of the lands owned by Castagno 
(R 70-71, 94, 95, 102, 104, 107, 284). The lands owned by 
the parties are as is shown in appropriate color on Exhibit I 
(R 116, 117, 122, 123, 126-8). The lands shown in blue 
thereon are owned and are under the control of Cassity and 
those shown in pink are owned by Castagno (R 116-117). 
Those shown in green, yellow and purple are leased by 
Castagno (R 116-117). Those shown in green, yellow and 
purple are leased by Castagno (R 114). The lands left without 
color are either owned by third parties or they are a part of 
the remaining public domain (Ex. I, R 122). 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
While the other holdings of the parties and related areas 
are shown on the Exhibit I map the area with which we are 
almost exclusively concerned in this appeal is that area which is 
bounded on Exhibit I by the blue colored lands and by the south 
shore of Great Salt Lake located in Township 2 South, Range 
5 West, and that area within Sections 7, 18 and 19 along the 
extreme westernmost tier of Sections in Township 2 South, 
Ronge 4 West, SLM (R 222, 237-8). A fence beginning on 
the shore of Great Salt Lake extends due south along the east 
side of said Sections 7, 18 and 19 (R 157) to the north 
boundary of the State Highway, (R 11) where it joins the 
fence extending along the north side of said highway to the 
east side of the right of way of the Tooele Branch of the 
Western Pacific Railroad (R 12). This right of way is then 
fenced northwesterly to the juncture of this Branch Line with 
the Main Line of the Western Pacific Railroad (R 12, 13). 
The north line of this area is naturally fenced by the swampy 
mud flats of the shores of Great Salt Lake. This considerable 
area is enclosed by the above described boundary fence (R 11, 
12, 13). The Cassity and the Castagno lands colored in Sec-
tions 16, 20, 21, 27, 28, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
which are along the west side of the right-of-way of the Tooele 
Branch of the Western Pacific Railroad are separately fenced 
dividing the said Cassity from the Castagno lands. A fence 
also extends along the west line of said right-of-way which 
forms a part of the fence of the Cassity lands located along 
the west side of this right-of-way. One place only is provided 
where livestock may be taken across this right-of-way from 
the Cassity lands on the east side thereof to those located west 
of that railroad line. Gates are set in the fence line to be used 
8 
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for this purpose in Section 22, T. 2 S., R. 5 W., SLM (Ex. 1, 
R 102, 103, 104). 
The appellant Cassity and the respondent Castagno are 
brothers in law (R 5). Their respective fathers-in-law and 
:ather formerly owned the lands with which we are involved 
lere (R 5, 115, 292), and upon the distribution of his estate 
n about 1939 (R 109) Cassity bought the interests of each 
leir, including the interest of respondent, in the estate lands, 
md so came into the ownership of the ranch and range land 
loldings of his wife's father (R 6, 8-10, 109, 121). This 
)roperty has been used as a cattle ranch for about the last 
'5 years by the appellant and his predecessor, his father-in-
aw (R 95, 104, 112, 133). Several hundred head of cattle 
md horses have been operated upon these lands (R 131, 225), 
md are now operated by appellant (R. 169, 301). During 
he summer season the Cassity livestock graze upon meadow 
ands located within a fenced area east of the branch line of 
Western Pacific and north of the State Highway and in Town-
hip 2 South, Range 5 West, the west side of the line of 
vhich is 4.2 miles east of the community of Grantsville, 
Jtah (Ex I ) . Upon lands within this same area hay is har-
ested and stacked which is fed to the calves while they are 
»eing weaned from the cows during the winter season, and 
lso used to feed such animals as need to be fed hay during 
he winter. During the winter season all other Cassity live-
tock are trailed from the above summer grazing meadows 
cross the low lying lands near the shore of Great Salt Lake 
or about 20 miles to Stansbury Island (R 128-29, V9-10a.-
., R 286). Here they graze upon lands owned by Cassity and 
lso upon adjacent public domain lands for the grazing of 
9 
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which Cassity holds a grazing permit issued by the Govern-
ment. During the winter grazing season such cattle as become 
poor on this island and require hay are trailed back along 
this same trail to the hay and meadow lands heretofore de-
scribed which adjoin the south end of Great Salt Lake (R 
251-2), and all of the remaining livestock are trailed back 
from this winter range to the summer grazing meadows in the 
spring of each year (R 128-29, V9, VlO a.b.).* This has 
been the method of grazing and moving this same outfit of 
cattle in their year-long operation for the last 75 years and 
for so long as it has been in existence. 
The route over which these cattle have been trailed be-
tween the winter and the summer range has been along a 
well-defined route as indicated with a pencil mark on Exhibit 
I, ever since this cattle operation began under the ownership 
of Cassity's father-in-law (R 70-71, 273, 294, 302, 308). 
From the meadows in Township 2 South, Range 5 West, it 
extended northwesterly through Sections 23, 15, 9, 10, 4 and 
5 of this township into that triangular shaped parcel of land 
in the east half of the said section 5 which adjoins on the east 
the branch line of the Western Pacific Railroad (Ex. I, R 70-
71, 250-52, 294, 308). This parcel of land is separately en-
closed with a fence along the boundary lines of the area 
colored in blue in the shape of a triangle in Section 5 of this 
township (R 283-4) on Exhibit I. It constitutes the overnight 
holding pasture used by Cassity when these cattle are being 
driven from one range to the other, particularly when they 
are being taken from the summer to the winter range (R 143, 
*=Verdict 
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284). The cattle cannot be taken the entire distance from the 
summer to the winter range in one day and unless they are 
kept confined during the night (R 303) in an enclosure they 
will, before the following morning, drift back to the range 
from which they have been last moved (R 284, 143). A very 
considerable amount of additional horseback riding would then 
be required to gather the cattle and get them back on the trail 
moving in the direction of their destination. There is no other 
practical trail or route over which these cattle may be trailed 
between these range areas (R 254, 284, 286). Fenced fields 
with no lanes or roads stand in the way of taking these cattle 
due west from the Cassity summer meadows to the road which 
extends north to the winter range (Ex. I, R 252-4). Because 
of the heavy automobile traffic along the State Highway which 
bounds the summer meadows and hay lands on the south, the 
cattle cannot safely, if at all, be trailed along this route through 
the town of Grantsville to the road which leads north into 
the winter range area. Also the distance around this State High-
way route would be unreasonably longer than that which has 
been used these many decades (Ex. l ) . And the route used 
in the past is open so that there is no interference with the 
free and easy movement of the livestock which can, when 
extremely harsh conditions develop on the winter range, trail 
back to the hay yards of their own volition and without any 
person being required to be attending them (R 253-4, 265). 
This is a very considerable advantage in this operation. It 
is to be noted from Exhibit 1 that the route of this trail within 
the fenced area east of the Tooele Branch line of the Western 
Pacific Railroad is largely across lands owned by Castagno, 
and along the major portion of which trail Cassity owns little 
11 
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or no land (Ex. l ) . These Castagno lands have never been 
fenced, except for the fact that a temporary fence was once 
constructed around a part of that 80-acre tract in about 1935 
which was acquired by Castagno as a homestead (R 62, 63). 
Cassity became manager of the estate of his father-in-law upon 
the death of the latter in 1928 (R 61) and he continued to 
operate this livestock outfit in that capacity until he acquired 
all interest of the heirs in that estate in about 1939 (R 61, 
121, 122). Since that time he has operated it as sole proprietor 
(R 169). Castagno's only work with cattle within this area 
was with his father's cattle. He left his father's ranch as a 
young man and went to California where he remained for 
about 7 years (R 6, 224, 225), returning upon his father's 
death in 1928 (R 61) to this ranch where he worked for a 
time under Cassity (R 62). Sometime after the estate was 
distributed in about 1949 (R 145), Castagno acquired a small 
number of cattle, but his operations have not been within the 
area of the hay fields nor meadows of Cassity enclosed by fence 
east of the branch railroad line (R 144). Castagno has 
operated this small number of cattle upon the lands both to 
the east and to the west of the Casisty lands, indicated as being 
under the ownership or leasehold control of Castagno (Ex. 
1, R 144, 227-8). Castagno has, with permission of Cassity, 
trailed his livestock back and forth through the Cassity lands 
as necessity required in moving them back and forth from 
his holdings on either side of the Cassity lands in T. 2 S., 
R. 5 W. (R 145, 147). 
Upon parts of these lands colored in pink on Exhibit 1, 
owned by Castagno, and located in Sections 4, 9, 10, 15 and 
12 
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22, water holes fed by springs are located (R 84, 88, 175, 
178-9, 181, 192, 231, 256-57, 279, 281, 295, 309, 314, 316). 
These springs never dry up, but the quantity of water they 
produce varies with the wet and dry years (R 84, 175, 255-56, 
279, 281-295, 304). These waters are good for livestock use 
and have been used by the Cassity cattle and horses and by 
those of his predecessor (his father-in-law) each and every 
year next preceding this lawsuit for 75 years or more (R 83, 
84, 88, 256, 279, 295, 309). With these lands of Castagno 
having been open all of this time the cattle have used them 
as freely in all ways as they have used the lands owned by 
Cassity for all of this period of time (R 256) and the water 
holes are important and of value in the grazing of the Cassity 
cattle (R 255-57, 311). Indeed it is not possible to graze 
livestock in this area without having them regularly use these 
waters, and their use is required in making the most efficient 
grazing utilization of the forage produced upon the Cassity 
lands (R 255-57). 
Whenever Cassity grazes the lands he owns which are 
enclosed by fence and which are located in this same township 
2 South, Range 5 West, along the west side of the said branch 
railroad line he must drive them into this area from his larger 
fenced area on the east side of the fence (R 258). In making 
this movement of cattle it has been his practice, and that of 
his predecessor, for these 75 years or more to drive them 
across the Castagno lands located in sections 22 and 15 
of this same township, through the gates in the railroad fence 
and into his pastures on the west side of the right-of-way. 
They have been returned to the big pasture area in the same 
13 
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manner (R 258-59). This has been and remains the only 
natural and practical way to move the livestock between these 
areas (R 259). 
All of this use over these years by Cassity and his prede-
cessor of the lands now owned by Castagno and of the waters 
located upon those lands has been without the consent or 
permission of the owners of these lands having been given 
(R 286-87), except that since the enactment of the Taylor 
Grazing Act in 1934 and until Castagno acquired these public 
domain lands in Sec. 15 Cassity was granted a license by the 
government to graze these lands, and paid a fee for that use. 
Of these lands which are owned by Castagno those which 
are colored in pink and within the area designated by the 
numeral 5 were public domain lands down to the time they 
were acquired by Castagno from the government in 1953 
(R 118). The lands similarly colored and designated with 
the numeral 2 form a part of the Castagno homestead and 
the patent to those lands was issued in February, 1939 (R 170), 
but it was not shown when the Castagno application for home-
stead was approved. The law provides that three years shall 
intervene between the filing and the making proof to the gov-
ernment in compliance with regulations which warrant the 
issuance of patent (43 USCA 164). As to the lands owned 
by Castagno in Section 22 and designated with the numeral 
3, they were purchased by him from Seigel-Williams in 1944 
(R 119). An important water hole is located upon these lands, 
used by the Cassity livestock for more than 75 years (R 25, 67). 
As against the approximately 5700 acres (Ex. 1) of lands 
owned by Cassity, in the area south of Great Salt Lake with 
14 
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which we are particularly concerned, they will adequately 
feed for at least six months not less than 350 head of cattle 
(R 131) and approximately 100 horses (R 225), and the 
barren lands of respondent, including the lands he leases 
within the said Cassity land area, will feed 10 head of cattle 
for six months (R 80, 174-75, 269, 285). Some of these 
Castagno lands are barren (R 175). While Cassity grazes 
these lands as well as his Stansbury Island lands each year 
in a continuing livestock operation (R 280, 286), Castagno 
takes no livestock to Stansbury Island (R 128), does not use 
the lands under his control east of the branch line of the 
Western Pacific in T 2 S, R 5 W., (R 162) but only trails 
his cattle across the Cassity lands in this fenced area of this 
township (R 145, 147). Castagno grazes only a comparatively 
small number of cattle (R 147) and moves them across the 
Cassity lands which are between the lands he leases which 
are located to the east and to the west of these Cassity lands 
(R 145-47). 
Castagno held no lands except his 80-acre homestead (R 
170) within the area with which we are particularly con-
cerned, which is east of the branch line of the Western Pacific 
Railroad and west of the east line of the Section 7 lying next 
east of that line and all of which area is in T. 2 S., R. 4 and 
5 W., until 1944 when he acquired the 200 acres in Section 
22, T. 2 S., R. 5 W., (R 119, Ex. 1). Thereafter he acquired 
the 1,000 acres of public domain from the government in 
1953 (R 118). While Castagno did not receive the patent to 
his 80-acre homestead within this area until February 16, 
1939 (R 170) it is likely that he had filed his entry upon this 
15 
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land prior to 1933 because he endeavored to cut hay from this 
acreage in 1933 or 1935 (R 272). 
Along with his brothers, Castagno had sold to Cassity his 
interest in the lands of the estate of his deceased father in 
November of 1939 (R 121), the very year Castagno had 
already secured the patent to this 80-acre homestead (R 170). 
Castagno had agreed also to sell this 80 acres to Cassity, but 
thereafter refused to sell on the previously arranged terms 
(R 9-10). Castagno grew up in this cattle outfit and knew the 
location and relative relationship of the lands in this area 
(R 6, 7, 145, 147). Mrs. Cassity is his sister (R 142). Feelings 
of hostility have grown out of their relationship (R 199)-
A permanent road and trail has existed through these 
lands for many years (R 158, 159, 194, 195-96, 229, 250, 
251, 273, 309). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED A RIGHT TO 
THE USE OF WATER LOCATED UPON RESPONDENT'S 
LANDS. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AP-
PELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO TRAIL 
HIS LIVESTOCK OVER AND ACROSS THE LANDS OF 
RESPONDENT. 
16 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THE LAND OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENT. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROHIBITING 
APPELLANT FROM TRAILING HIS LIVESTOCK ACROSS 
A PORTION OF RESPONDENT'S LAND, TO WIT, SWy4-
NE& AND NW^SEVi OF SECTION 15, IN THAT RE-
SPONDENT SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN ESTOP-
PED FROM DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY 
THEREIN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED A RIGHT TO 
THE USE OF WATER LOCATED UPON RESPONDENT'S 
LANDS. 
Under this point, while it is not made clearly to appear 
from the language of the Judgment or from the Findings of 
the Trial Court, four separate conditions are suggested to 
control in the determinations of the Judgment that Cassity 
could not acquire any right to the use of these waters. These are: 
17 
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1. Has the period of use by Cassity been for such a con-
tinuous period of time that a diligence right has 
come into existence? 
2. May one acquire the right to use waters upon pri-
vately owned lands of another which waters rise 
and remain in a pool upon those lands? 
3. May one acquire the right to use such waters as de-
scribed in 2 above which are located upon public 
domain, and if so, does the right continue after the 
public domain passes into private ownership? 
4. Are the waters here of a type and a quality which 
can be put to beneficial use? 
The questions presented will be considered in the above 
order. 
1. Has the period of use by Cassity been for such a con-
tinuous period of time that a diligence right has come into 
existence? It is clear that Cassity and his wife's father, his 
predecessor in interest, used the ranch involved within which 
the Castagno lands are located, and upon which lands the 
waters involved are located for 75 consecutive years or more 
immediately prior to the filing of this case. The testimony bears 
this out. The fact that the verdict of the jury in its answer to 
question 11 (a) shows that the waters had been used for 50 
years is not to be strictly interpreted. There is no evidence 
that the waters had been used for 50 years, and no evidence 
from which the jury could make any reasonable inference or 
deduction that the use had been for 50 years or for any lesser 
period of time. It is apparent that the jury used the term 50 
years to represent their judgment that the use had been for a 
long period; for the period contended by Cassity, and not to 
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mean for the number of years which the figure 50, when 
strictly construed, would mean. 
The 75 year period of use which is well supported by 
the evidence would reach back to about the year 1880 for 
the beginning of this period of use. This is well in advance 
of the year 1903, during which year the statute was enacted 
which now governs the methods and procedures to be followed 
in the appropriation of water rights. There is no contest here 
as to who first put the water to beneficial use. Proof that one 
had beneficially used water for several years prior to 1903 
will suffice to show an appropriation. Salt Lake City Water 
and Electrical Power Co. v. Salt Lake City and Ann Cannon, 
25 Utah 441, 71 P. 1067 (1903). 
Even though a right initiated prior to 1903 had not been 
completed when the statute of that year was enacted the right 
may nevertheless be perfected. Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 
76 Utah 356, 289 P. 1097. 
2. May one acquire the right to use waters upon privately 
owned lands of another which waters rise and remain in a 
pool upon those lands ? The evidence is clear, except as to the 
lands in Section 22, here that all of the lands now owned by 
Castagno within the area south of Great Salt Lake (the area 
in question) were all a part of the public domain during the 
time they were appropriated. The 80-acre homestead was not 
patented until 1939, although it was filed upon sometime 
prior to 1933 or 1935, and the 1,000 acres of "exchange" 
lands were acquired from the government in 1953. No testi-
mony was developed as to when the lands in Section 22 were 
patented. The waters are located upon the lands in Sections 9, 
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15 and 22, and possibly upon other of the public domain lands 
which were conveyed to Castagno in 1953. 
3. May one acquire the right to use such waters as de-
scribed in 2 above which are located upon public domain, 
and if so, does the right continue after the public domain 
passes into private ownership? One who beneficially uses 
water upon public domain acquires an easement in the land 
for the purpose of continuing his use, and one who later 
acquires the land from the government takes it subject to this 
easement and subject to the appropriators's right to use the 
water. Sullivan v. The Northern Spy Mining Company, 11 
Utah 438, 40 P 709, 30 LRA 186 (1895). While there had 
formerly been a question as to whether one could acquire the 
right to use waters located upon the lands of aonther which 
waters never flowed off those lands, such waters have always 
been available for appropriation where located upon the public 
domain. Deseret v. Hoopiana, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479, (1925). 
4. Are the waters here of a type and quality which can 
be put to beneficial use? Water may be appropriated through 
the use made by livestock drinking directly from the open, 
natural stream, without any diversion of the waters being re-
quired. Adams v. Portage Irrigation Reservoir & Power, 95 
Utah 1, 72 P2d 648, (1938). 
The Judgment of the trial Court provides that the waters 
here are not a type or quality which can be appropriated with-
out specifying any reasons to support that position. The 
testimony of all of the witnesses, except Castagno himself, 
is to the effect that the waters issue from the earth in the 
center of pools, that these waters never dry up, and that they 
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have been regularly used for many years by cattle and horses. 
The trial Court, in its findings, determines that the waters 
are waste waters, surface or percolating water "produced by 
rain water and melting snows." It is submitted that all water 
outside the seas is produced by rain or by melting snows. There 
is no evidence that any of these waters are waste waters. The 
witness for Castagno, Marcellus Palmer, testified that the basins 
in which these waters were found were oval, slightily elevated 
basins. How then could run-off water enter them? 
As to the quality of the waters the evidence is substantial 
and not to be disregarded that the cattle and horses had con-
sumed this water for many years. Quality of the water has 
nothing to do with the question as to whether it may be ap-
propriated, so long as it can be put to a beneficial use. And its 
consumption by livestock is such a use. 
The Findings of Fact of the trial Court are to the effect 
in Paragraph 19 that "a small proportion of this water is 
probably water which percolates and has percolated through 
the soil of defendant's lands," suggesting that waters which 
course through the lands of one party may not be the subject 
of appropriation by another. There is no merit to this position. 
Springs are defined as those places where water issues naturally 
from the earth's surface, and such waters, without regard to 
the quantity, may be appropriated. Homan v. Christensen, 73 
Utah 389, 274 P. 457 (1929). The waters of a spring may 
be appropriated just as any other surface water. It is im-
material whether these spring waters percolate to the surface 
or flow to the surface through a subterranean channel. Peterson 
v. Lund, 57 Utah 162, 193 P 1087, (1920). The old common 
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law rule relating to percolating waters has never been adopted 
in this state. Wrathell v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P2d 755, 
(1935), Home v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P 
815, (1921), Stookey v. Green, 53 Utah 311, 178 P 586, 
(1919). 
There is also no merit to the trial Court's finding that 
no known and defined subterranean channel exists upon de-
fendant's lands. Certainly if no water issuing from the earth 
could be appropriated until the appropriator could prove the 
existence or the location of the underground course it fol-
lowed prior to reaching its point of issuance, no waters of 
this class would ever have been appropriated. 
There is no showing in the testimony that these waters 
had been previously appropriated, and so could not be subject 
to appropriation by Cassity or his predecessors. The statement 
in the Findings of the trial Court that no attempt had been 
made to appropriate the waters under the statutes of the 
state is quite meaningless in view of the fact that the appro-
priation is clearly shown to have been accomplished through 
a diligence claim which came into existence prior to the enact-
ment of statutes governing this matter. It appears that the 
Court was straining to find anything upon which to base a 
rejection of the theory that Cassity owned the right to the 
use of these waters in his livestock operation, and indulged 
in Findings totally unsupported by the evidence in some in-
stances, and unrelated to the problem in others. 
If distinction is to be made between waters located upon 
privately owned as against waters located upon public domain, 
it is to be kept in mind that these lands were public domain, 
except for Section 22, during the time these water rights were 
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initiated and perfected. In paragraph 20 of the Findings by 
the trial Court it is stated "the evidence completely fails to 
establish the user of said water for the purposes aforesaid 
by plaintiff and his predecessors in title and interest prior to 
May 11, 1903, for the prescriptive period of 20 years." The 
law, at no time, required the use to have been for 20 years 
prior to the enactment of the 1903 statute in order to appro-
priate waters. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co. 
v. Salt Lake City and Ann Cannon, 25 Utah 441, 71 P 1067, 
(1903), Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P 118, (1910), 
Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 P 1097, (1930). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AP-
PELLANT HAD NOT ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO TRAIL 
HIS LIVESTOCK OVER AND ACROSS THE LANDS OF 
RESPONDENT. 
In addition to the right acquired by Cassity to have his 
livestock trail into and from the waters located upon the 
Castagno lands, additional easements have been acquired in 
these lands in trailing the livestock back and forth to the 
winter range lands located on Stansbury Island, about 20 miles 
from the area involved here on the south end of Great Salt 
Lake, which constitutes the summer pasture meadows as well 
as the hay producing lands. Also Cassity has acquired an ease-
ment to move his livestock back and forth between his holdings 
south of the said lake which are located on the east side of 
the Western Pacific right of way, and those which are located 
on the west side of that fenced right of way. This easement 
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has been acquired across the lands embraced within the 80-
acre homestead in Section 15, as well as across the lands owned 
by Castagno in Section 22, since they became privately owned 
lands. This right across these lands was created by prescription. 
There is an additional creation of a right to trail the livestock 
across the said homestead and across the Castagno lands in 
Sections 4, 9, 10 and 15, by reason of the establishment of a 
public road across those lands. This public road problem will 
be discussed herein following the discussion of the creation 
of an easement since the 80 acres in Section 15 and the Castagno 
lands in Section 22 became privately owned. 
As to the 80-acre homestead it may be conceded that 
patent to this tract was not issued by the government to 
Castagno until February, 1939, as is set forth in paragraph 10 
of the Findings of Fact. But the date of the patent is not the 
governing date fixing the earliest date for the running of the 
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period begins to run upon 
the approval of the application for the homestead which is 
filed with the U. S. Land Office. The trial Court would not 
permit evidence to go into the record to specifically show the 
date this homestead entry was made at least 20 years before 
the action herein was commenced (R 272). As of the time 
of the approval of a homestead entry the entryman acquires 
the exclusive right to possession of the land and to the enjoy-
ment of its products; he may sue for trespass committed upon 
the lands, and the equitable title belongs to him with the 
government holding the naked legal title until the patent is 
issued, at which time the full legal and equitable title in the 
land merge, 73 CJS page 691, Public Lands, Sec. 41. The 
period for prescription begins to run from the time some act 
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is done which gives the party against whom the right of ease-
ment is claimed, a cause of action. 28 CJS Eastments, par. 6, 
page 642. 
The period of prescription in Utah is 20 years. Morris 
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 245, 161 P 1129; Lunt v. Kitchins, 260 
P2d 535, 1953. The evidence is clear and the trial Court made 
a Finding (paragraph 15) that Cassity had trailed across these 
lands for 20 years prior to the bringing of this action. The 
evidence is clearly that this use had been made for 75 years, 
and not merely for 20 years. 
As to the lands located in Section 22 owned by Castagno, 
it is certain that these lands except for the NW%NW^4 have 
been in private ownership for more than the necessary 20-
year period prior to the commencement of this action (R 
258-59). Here, too, the trial Court refused to permit testimony 
to show the use of these lands in Section 22 (R 259-63). It 
is not claimed that these lands in Section 22 were used in 
trailing the cattle to and from the winter range on Stansbury 
Island, but it is set forth in the complaint and attempt was 
made (R 258-62) to prove the use made by Cassity and his 
predecessors in moving the cattle across these lands in taking 
them back and forth between the lands on the west and on the 
east side of the railroad track of the Western Pacific in T. 
2 S., R. 5 W., SLM. 
As a further basis for the right on the part of Cassity 
to use the lands of Castagno in his livestock trailing operations 
in moving to and from the lands south of Great Salt Lake and 
the winter ranges on Stansbury Island, a public road has existed 
across these lands, except for those in Section 22, for many 
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years and which was established across them during the time 
these lands were a part of the public domain. The evidence 
discloses that this road was used many years ago in construc-
tion of the telegraph line along the main line of the railroad, 
in moving vehicles back and forth between Stansbury Island 
and the ranges north of the town of Tooele by the early set-
tlers. Cassity and his father-in-law have used this old road 
and trail for more than 75 years in driving livestock, and in 
taking supplies by wagon to and from Stansbury Island, and 
in hauling wood back from that island to the home ranch in 
T. 2 S., R. 5 W. This use has been for many years more than 
the period required for the establishment of this road. The 
use made of this road was by many persons in past years and 
has been as general and extensive as the situation and sur-
roundings would permit. The road followed a reasonably 
certain route over these lands, without undue deviation as is 
shown on Exhibit 1, and as testified to by all of Cassity's 
witnesses, all of whom had used this trail. 
By act of Congress passed in 1866, Revised Statutes U.S. 
Sec. 2477 (43 USCA Sec. 932), it was provided: "The right 
of way for the construction of highways over public lands, 
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." 
It has been held by this Act the government consented 
that any of its lands not reserved for a public purpose might 
be taken and used for public roads. "The statute was a standing 
offer of a free right of way over the public domain, and as 
soon as it was accepted in an appropriate manner by the agents 
of the public, or the public itself, a highway was established/' 
Streeter v. Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 N.W. 47. 
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The grant for the roadway over the public lands may be 
accepted by public use without formal action by public authori-
ties. Use for 5 years was all the use required in Utah as pro-
vided in Chapter 29, Laws of Utah, 1880, and by Chapter 12, 
Laws of Utah, 1886, Sec. 2, it was provided: 
"All roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or 
dedicated by others than the public and dedicated or 
abandoned to the use of the public are highways. A 
highway shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously and uninterruptedly used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years/' 
Under this set of circumstances a public road is estab-
lished in which the members of the public acquire an easement 
for their use. Lindsey Land & Livestock Co. v. Chournos, 75 
U 384, 285 Pac 646, Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P2d 422. 
And one who acquires title to lands upon which a high-
way, as herein, has been established takes title subject to this 
easement. U. S. v. Pruden, 172 F2d 503-05 (10th Circuit 
1949), which cites the above cited Chournos and Bertagnole 
cases. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVI-
DENCE. 
The trial Court erred in excluding evidence during the 
trial. Among the errors committed in preventing testimony to 
be offered in behalf of Cassity are the following: 
1. The Court would not permit testimony on behalf of 
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Cassity to show that he had used the lands owned by Castagno 
over the years (R 262-63). This proof was a necessity in order 
to establish the creation of an easement in the lands. 
2. The Court restricted proof on the element of damage 
(R 270). 
3. The Court would not allow proof in behalf of Cassity 
that his predecessor, his father-in-law, had used and operated 
these properties inside the fence south of the lake (R 280-81). 
It was material and competent to show the use of the previous 
owner of the property, who is dead, in order to tie the use 
from one owner to the next, to establish the creation of the 
easements which Cassity claimed had come into existence to 
use Castagno's lands. 
4. The Court refused to allow testimony in behalf of 
Cassity that was intended to prove that, as to the water holes 
located on the Castagno lands, they contained water all through 
in the driest year ever on record, the year 1956 (R 282, 283). 
Therewas a conflict in the testimony about the quantity of water 
which was in the alleged water holes, whether the water was 
available for livestock use, or whether the holes were dry 
most of the time. Proof should have been permitted to go in 
that, although 1956 was a year subsequent to the filing of the 
complaint, the water holes contained water all through that 
dry year. This would go to prove the continuous availability 
of water in the water holes. 
5. The Court would not allow testimony to show when 
the Castagno 80-acre homestead in Section 15 was filed upon 
(R 287). This was material to Cassity's case because the 
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period of prescription begins to run as of the time the filing 
is made, and not as of the time the patent is issued by the 
Government. The filing precedes the patent. 
6. The Court would not allow counsel for Cassity to pursue 
questioning of Castagno, designed to aid in proving an estop-
pel, that he had agreed to sell his homestead to Cassity if he 
should buy out the lands and livestock of the estate of 
Castagno's father (R 10-11). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THE LAND OWNERSHIP OF RESPONDENT. 
The trial Court made findings (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, page 3) that Castagno owns and has 
owned for all times herein the following described lands: 
T. 2 South, Range 5 West, SLM 
Sec. 22, (NW1/4NE1/4), ( N E ^ N W ^ ) , NW%NW%, 
(SW%NW%), SE%NW%, SW%NE%, 
(wy2swy4), NEiAsw1/^ Ny2SEy4. 
The said Court made the same determination as to land 
ownership in its Judgment (page 3) and entered its restrain-
ing order prohibiting Cassity from using any of the above 
described lands. As a matter of fact, and in accordance with 
the testimony, Cassity owns and has owned, for all times herein, 
the 200 acres of the above described lands which are enclosed 
with brackets. The Exhibit 1 clearly shows this contention to 
be the fact, and there is no testimony anywhere in the record 
to support this Finding or this part of the Judgment. Although 
this was brought to the attention of the trial Court in written 
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briefs in support of the motion for a new trial which was filed 
in behalf of Cassity, and in that motion, the Court refused to 
make any change in its Findings or in its Judgment. 
As the situation now stands Cassity is prohibited and 
restrained from making a trailing use of the lands owned 
by Castagno over which he has clearly established the right 
to trail back and forth to the winter range on Stansbury Island, 
and between his lands east and those west of the spur line of 
Western Pacific Railroad, and to get to and from the water 
holes which he and his predecessor, father-in-law, used for 
75 continuous years, but this Judgment restrains Cassity from 
using lands which he owns and to the use of which there is 
no evidence to support any claim whatsoever by Castagno. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROHIBITING 
APPELLANT FROM TRAILING HIS LIVESTOCK ACROSS 
A PORTION OF RESPONDENT'S LAND, TO WIT, SWV4-
NE!/4 AND NW%SE% OF SECTION 15, IN THAT RE-
SPONDENT SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE BEEN ESTOP-
PED FROM DENYING APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF WAY 
THEREIN. 
The evidence adduced below indicates clearly that prior 
to the acquisition by appellant of the livestock now owned 
by appellant respondent clearly indicated to appellant that 
upon payment by appellant of the debts and obligations of 
the Castagno estate and upon acquisition of the livestock 
therefrom by appellant, respondent would then sell to appel-
lant an 80-acre tract of land, to-wit, SW^NEVi, NW^SE 1^ 
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of Section 15 (R 10-11). The evidence and the natural infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom is abundantly clear that in reliance 
upon respondent's promise appellant did in fact discharge 
the debts and obligations of said estate and did purchase 
and did acquire the said livestock, and thereafter continued to 
trail said cattle across said tract of land as had been done in the 
past in reasonable expectation that the said land would be con-
veyed unto him. Respondent, on the other hand, after the pay-
ment of said debts and obligations and after the acquisition of 
said herd by appellant, failed and refused to honor his promise, 
and has in fact, gone one step further by asserting the right to 
prevent appellant from trailing said cattle across his lands. 
Under the facts and evidence as stated above, it appears 
abundantly clear that the elements of an equitable promissory 
estoppel are present and that to deny appellant the right to 
trail said cattle across said lands would be unfair, inequitable 
and unconscionable by reason of his change of position and 
reasonable reliance upon respondent's promise to convey said 
lands. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been defined as 
follows: 
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary 
conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded 
both at law and in equity from asserting rights which 
might perhaps have otherwise existed either of prop-
erty, of contract or of remedy, as against another per-
son who has in good faith relied upon such conduct 
and has been led thereby to change his position for 
the worse and who on his part acquires some corres-
ponding right either of property, of contract or of 
remedy." Pomery, Equity Jurisprudence, Vol 3, Sec-
tion 804, Page 189. 
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This doctrine as it originally developed was not applied gen-
erally by the courts against one whose conduct consisted merely 
of promises or statements of intention to do an act or a thing 
in the future, but was restricted primarily to conduct involving 
a representation of an existing or past fact. However, sub-
sequently, in the development of this doctrine, the courts 
have become more liberal in their application of the same 
and have expanded it to include statements concerning future 
facts. Pomeroy, ibid, Section 808(b); Anno at 115 A.L.R. 
152. As stated by the court in the case of Fried vs. Fisher, 
328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39 115 A.L.R. 147 (1938), an estoppel 
may arise from the making of a promise even though without 
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be 
relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and refusal to 
enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of 
fraud or would result in other injustice. 
Professor Williston states the doctrine to be as follows: 
'There would seem, however, compelling reasons 
of justice for enforcing promises, where injustice can-
not otherwise be avoided, when they have led the 
promisee to incur any substantial detriment on the faith 
of them, not only when the promissor intended, but also 
when he should reasonably have expected such detri-
ment to be incurred though he did not request it as 
an exchange for his promise." I Williston Contracts, 
Revised Edition, Page 502, Paragraph 139. 
The rule is laid down in the American Law Institute's 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Paragraph 90, that 
"The promise which the promissor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite 
and substantial character on the part of the promisee 
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and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promises." 
It is conceded that in the present case, appellant is not seek-
ing to acquire the fee simple title by an action of specific per-
formance, but is merely asserting his right to trail his cattle across 
a portion of respondent's land for which he is willing to pay to 
respondent a fair, reasonable compensation therefor. It is fur-
ther conceded that the doctrine commonly known as promis-
sory estoppel is principally applied as a substitute for consider-
ation. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that said 
doctrine is basically an equitable one, (15 A.L.R. 152 et seq.) 
founded upon the desire of the courts to prevent injustice and 
it is respectfully submitted that equity and justice in the case 
at bar demanded the application of said doctrine to estop 
respondent from asserting his rights of ownership in preventing 
appellant from trailing his livestock across respondent's land 
to the appellant's detriment, said trailing being a fact not only 
necessary for the continuation of appellant's present live-
stock operation, but also constitutes an act reasonably foreseen 
and anticipated by respondent at the time he promised to 
convey said land. 
The respective equities in the situation that now exist by 
reason of the decree of the court below become even more 
acutely apparent inasmuch as appellant's entire cattle opera-
tion is in jeopardy of being completely and absolutely halted 
with severe attendant monetary loss to appellant, whereas 
respondent's operation is completely unaffected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cassity is entitled to continue to use the lands owned 
by Castagno which are intermingled with the Cassity owner-
ship in the township south of Great Salt Lake for the three 
uses: to trail back and forth to and from the winter range 
which is located on Stansbury Island, about 20 miles from 
the intermingled summer grazing and hay land area; to trail 
back and forth to and from his summer lands on the east and 
on the west side of the Western Pacific Railroad; and to trail 
into and from the water holes located upon the Castagno 
lands, the water upon which Cassity has acquired through 
continuous use for a period prior to the Utah water statute 
of 1903. The Jury answered each of the interrogatories sub-
mitted to it relating to these questions favorably to the position 
of Cassity, and the evidence did not support the findings of the 
trial Court which, for all practical purposes nullified the 
verdict of the Jury. 
Under the authorities and arguments presented herein, 
the judgment in this case should be reversed, and a new trial 
should be granted Cassity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OMAN & SAPERSTEIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
Received...M^^:;-.-.-C0pies of the foregoing brief of 
appellant this ^ . . . ^ . d a y of April, 1958. 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent (ft? 
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